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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Christopher Weaver appeals from the district court's order denying his
objection to the court's order for restitution.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
Weaver pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled substance.

(R.,

pp.43-58.) Prior to sentencing, the Twin Falls County Prosecutor's Office filed a
Restitution Request in which it sought $300.00 for the costs of prosecution
pursuant to Idaho Code § 37-2732(k).

(R., pp.62-64.)

The court imposed a

sentence of seven years with one year determinate. (R., pp.66-71.) That same
day, the court entered an Order of Restitution, which ordered Weaver to pay a
total of $689.63 to several law enforcement agencies, including $300.00 to the
county prosecutor's office; the Order, in effect, gave no deadline for the
payment. 1

(R., pp.72-74.)

On June 11, 2013, the Twin Falls County District

Court Clerk filed an "Affidavit and Notice of Failure to Pay," which stated that if
the restitution monies owed were not paid by July 11, 2013, "pursuant to statute,
a collection agency will seek to collect any unpaid monies and will charge an

1

As noted by the district court at the restitution hearing, the Order of Restitution,
prepared by the prosecutor's office, incorrectly ordered payments to be made in
full by the time probation was terminated -- however, Weaver was never placed
on probation. (R., pp.72-73; Tr., p.13, Ls.14-24 (the judge asked the prosecutor's
office to correct the wording on the forms).)
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additional 33% of the money owed as a collection fee." (R., p.75.) Two days
later, Weaver filed an Objection to Order of Restitution, requesting "an order
amending the restitution ordered in this case." (R., pp.78-79.) At a hearing on
Weaver's objection to the restitution order, Weaver's attorney argued that
Weaver should be given an extension of time to pay his restitution debt, and that
the court clerk's referral of the debt to a collection agency -- with the attendant
33% fee -- should not be allowed by the district court. (See generally Tr., pp.317.) The court denied Weaver's motion, construing his request for additional time
to pay his restitution debt as a Rule 35 motion for leniency, and further
determining that it had no jurisdiction to interfere with the court clerk's statutory
authority to submit Weaver's debt to a collection agency. (R., pp.80, 95-96; Tr.,
p.10, L.1 - p.17, L.2.) Weaver filed a timely notice of appeal from that order. (R.,
pp.81-85.)

2

ISSUES

Weaver states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr.
Weaver's objection to the order of restitution?
(Appellant's Brief, p.4.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1. Has Weaver failed to show error in the amount of restitution ordered for the
costs of prosecution?
2. Did the district court properly deny, under Rule 35, Weaver's motion for
additional time to pay restitution?

3

ARGUMENT
I.
Weaver Has Failed To Show Error In The Amount Of Restitution Ordered For
The Costs Of Prosecution

A.

Introduction
The district court determined that the correct amount of restitution for the

costs of prosecution was $300.00.

(R., pp.62-64; Tr., p.11, L.9 - p.13, L.3.)

Weaver claims the district court erred in arriving at this figure because the state
did not support its request with substantial evidence. (Appellant's Brief, pp.5-8.)
Review of the record shows the restitution award is supported by the evidence.

B.

Standard Of Review
The decision whether to order restitution, and in what amount, is

committed to the trial court's discretion, and the trial court's factual findings in
relation to restitution will not be disturbed if supported by substantial evidence.
State v. Smith, 144 Idaho 687, 692, 169 P.3d 275, 280 (Ct. App. 2007).
"Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept to support a conclusion." State v. Straub, 153 Idaho 882, 885, 292 P.3d
273, 276 (2013) (citing State v. Corbus, 150 Idaho 599, 602, 249 P.3d 398, 401
(2011 )). The Court on appeal "will not overturn an order of restitution unless an
abuse of discretion is shown." State v. Lombard, 149 Idaho 819, 822, 242 P.3d
189, 192 (Ct. App. 2010) (citation omitted).
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C.

Weaver Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Restitution Order
The district court granted the state's request for restitution, made pursuant

to I.C. § 37-2732(k), for $300.00 based on the prosecutor's pay ($75.00 per hour)
for the time spent prosecuting Weaver's case (four hours).
p.11, L.9 - p.13, L.3.)

(R., pp.62-64; Tr.,

On appeal, Weaver contends the state failed to

"adequately document the time spent" by the prosecutor in prosecuting Weaver's
case, and improperly relying on estimates of time instead of actually tracking the
time spent for each task or court appearance.

(Appellant's Brief, pp.5-8.)

Weaver specifically argues:
The prosecutor's time request, while it purported to break down the
requested amount by the time spent on each aspect of the case ...
did not adequately document the time spent. For example, Mr.
Weaver expressly disputed the time claimed by the prosecutor for
his first appearance. At the objection to restitution hearing, Mr.
Weaver's counsel explained that Mr. Weaver was "wondering why,
for instance, it takes them 12 minutes to attend his first appearance
when his time at the table in his first appearance was less than 30
seconds." ...
Further, at the objection to restitution hearing the State
admitted that the prosecutor's time request was "an estimation,"
and that "We don't spend a lot of time tracking the numbers." ...
Based on the time discrepancy for the first appearance, and the
State's own admission that the prosecutor's time request was an
estimation, it cannot be said the prosecutor's time request was
supported by any "relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept to support a conclusion."
(Appellant's Brief, pp.7-8 (citations omitted).)
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After concluding the prosecutor's submission of an hourly rate of $75.00
per hour was reasonable within the legal community (Tr., p.11, L.9 - p.12, L.5),
the district court explained the flaw in Weaver's apparent contention that only the
prosecutor's courtroom time should be reimbursed:
Just to be picky about this, but [defense counsel] talked
about it, so I'll talk about it. In the first appearance, I know as a
matter of fact if that occurs, the defendant is in custody, somebody
from your office walks down here from the third or fourth floor of the
courthouse next door or the old courthouse, and sits in the
arraignment room over in courtroom 3 for whatever time it takes to
go through all those arraignments.
I grant you that the time that Mr. Weaver may have spent in
court wasn't very long. I don't know. I'll take counsel's word for
that, but that doesn't mean that the prosecutor didn't have to spend
more time than that getting here. Again, I have reviewed hundreds,
if not thousands of fee applications. I think that -- and I've also
done that in these kind of -- in these drug cases, and I find that the
request for the costs of prosecution from the prosecutor's office in
this case is reasonable, and I will overrule that objection.
(Tr., p.12, L.10 - p.13, L.3.) As the court determined, Weaver's complaint that the
prosecutor unreasonably requested reimbursement for 12 minutes for attending
Weaver's (allegedly) 30-second arraignment is not well-taken.

Not only would

the prosecutor have to walk to and from the courtroom, he would have typically
reviewed the case file to know whether any arraignment issues might arise, such
as conditions of release, and how to respond.
While the court's restitution order relied on estimates by the state about
the time spent prosecuting Weaver, the one estimate actually challenged by

6

Weaver was not out of the norm -- 12 minutes to attend Weaver's arraignment.
The $300.00 total amount of the state's Restitution Request for the costs of
prosecution (R., pp.62-64), derived by multiplying 4 hours of the prosecutor's
time by $75.00 per hour, constituted substantial evidence which "a reasonable
mind might accept." Straub, 153 Idaho at 885, 292 P.3d at 276. Weaver has
failed to show that the district court abused its discretion by ordering him to pay
$300.00 for the costs of prosecuting his case.

11.
The District Court Properly Denied, Under Rule 35, Weaver's Motion For
Additional Time To Pay Restitution

A

Introduction
Weaver claims the district court erred because it failed to appreciate it

"actually had discretion under I.C. § 37-2732(k) to extend the time frame to pay in
the restitution order. Thus, the district court abused its discretion when it denied
Mr. Weaver's Idaho Criminal Rule 35 request/objection to timeliness, because it
did not correctly perceive the issue as one of discretion."

(Appellant's Brief,

p.12.) Weaver assumes the district court's basis for refusing to extend the time
for paying restitution was because it believed it lacked jurisdiction over the court
clerk's debt collection methods, and therefore had no discretion to grant his
motion.

(See generally Appellant's Brief, pp.8-12, and specifically p.11 ("it

follows that a district court would also have discretion to extend a defendant's
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time to make payments pursuant to a restitution order without the defendant
incurring a cost of collection fee").)
Weaver's argument fails because the district court analyzed his motion for
an extension of time to pay restitution as a Rule 35 motion for leniency, and then
denied it.

B.

Standard Of Review
A court's decision not to reduce a sentence is reviewed for an abuse of

discretion subject to the well-established standards governing whether a
sentence is excessive. State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 27, 218 P.3d 5, 7 (Ct.
App. 2009). Jurisdiction is a question of law reviewed de novo. State v. Jones,
140 Idaho 755, 757, 101 P.3d 699, 701 (2004).

C.

Weaver Has Failed To Show Any Error In The District Court's Rulings
Contrary to Weaver's argument, the district court did not conclude that it

lacked discretion to extend his restitution payment deadline.

Rather, the court

first stated it was treating Weaver's request as a Rule 35 motion for leniency, and
denied it as such. Toward the end of ruling on what it deemed to be Weaver's
Rule 35 motion for leniency, the court lapsed into its reasons for deciding it
lacked jurisdiction to interfere with the court clerk's duties and authority in regard
to debt collection, as follows:

8

The more difficult matter, of course, is this issue of the
imposition of these financial obligations immediately. Mr. Weaver
is, in fact, in the penitentiary.

Technically, this objection is really not even an objection to
the restitution request. It's essentially a Rule 35 motion because it
seeks to issue -- to alter the order that says, Mr. Weaver, you owe
this obligation.
To the extent it is considered in that capacity, and I will, for
purposes of tHis [sic} record, it's timely, is a request for leniency, in
effect. I'm going to continue -- I am going to deny the motion, ...
because I have ruled [on] this issue already, and the reasoning is
this. As I read the statutes with regard to the obligation of the court
and the obligation of the clerk in collecting monies that are owed
either to the court system or to a victim, the responsibility for
ultimately enforcing those judgments or those orders are one of two
things ....
. . . What we're really talking about here is whose business
is it to collect monies owing to the court system? And as I read the
statutes for the clerks, it's their business. It's not mine. The
legislature has approved a system that allows the county clerk to
turn over to collection monies not paid within certain periods of
time.

. . . What's a person to do when they're sitting in the pen,
they have no assets, no ability to comply with the clerk's directive?
Now, all of a sudden, the bill's gone from a thousand bucks to
another third on top of that, which is authorized by the collection
statute. Is it fair? No. Is it illegal? No. Can I do anything about it?
In my opinion, no, because I don't have the jurisdiction to do that. I
think that is a statutory obligation of the clerk, and I'm not going to
interfere with their business ....
So on those grounds and for those reasons, the motion
either as a Rule 35 or as an objection to the timeliness -- I haven't
ordered anything as to when it's paid. That's what's really missing
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in this case, just says it's owed, and I'm not going to alter my
judgment in this case in terms of how it gets collected. So the
restitution order will stand.
(Tr., pp.13, L.4 - p.16, L.16 (emphasis added).)
Regardless of the transition between the district court's ruling on Weaver's
motion to extend the time for payment and its ruling that it lacked jurisdiction to
interfere with the court clerk's debt collection authority, the court characterized
Weaver's extension request as a Rule 35 motion for leniency, and denied it.
Although the court did not expressly say it had discretion to decide whether to
grant Weaver's motion for additional time to pay restitution, by deeming the
motion a Rule 35 request for leniency, the court had to have understood it had
discretion to either grant or deny the motion.

The fact that the court even

considered Weaver's Rule 35 motion for leniency shows that its "lack of
jurisdiction" comments were aimed at determining whether it had the right to
interfere with the court clerk's debt collection measures -- not whether it had
discretion to grant Weaver's motion for additional time to pay restitution.
Weaver has failed to show that the court abused its discretion, by failing to
realize it had discretion, when it denied his motion for an extension of time to pay
his restitution debt.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's Order
Denying Objection to Restitution Request.
DATED this 22nd day of April, 2014.

y Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 22nd day of April, 2014, served a true
and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a copy
addressed to:
BEN PATRICK MCGREEVY
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho
Supreme Court Clerk's office.

Johyf . McKinney
De y Attorney General

JCM/pm
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